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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine l’illégalité des décisions d’interdiction du burkini en 
France du point de vue de la tolérance, analysant les textes juridiques et les 
expressions politiques des maires par rapport à des facteurs caractéristiques 
de la tolérance moderne  –  vérité, bien commun, unité extérieure, paix et 
ordre publics, confiance. Bien que les juridictions supérieures en France et 
en Europe aient tendance à défendre la liberté individuelle dans ce type de 
cas, les tendances locales à l’intolérance qui visent la visibilité de l’altérité 
dans l’espace public sont profondément préoccupantes. De telles tendances 
pourraient se traduire par diverses réglementations restrictives qui impliquent 
de se prémunir contre une régression de la liberté religieuse individuelle.
ABSTRACT
This paper qualifies the unlawfulness of the 2016 “burkini bans” in France 
from the perspective of toleration. It asserts that they reveal a tendency 
towards intolerance, evaluating the legal texts and political expressions of 
mayors against specific factors of early modern toleration –  truth, common 
good, (outward) unity, public peace and order, and trust. Although higher 
courts in France and Europe tend to defend individual freedom in this and 
adjacent types of legal questions, local tendencies towards intolerance which 
target the visibility of otherness in the open space are profoundly concerning. 
Such tendencies might translate into variations of restrictive regulations, which 
indicate need to guard against regression in lieu of (individual) religious 
freedom.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The visibility of religious difference in the shared public and private space 
has historically been key to levels of toleration and integration. Although 
the dominant narrative is that early modern toleration has been replaced 
by a sophisticated legal framework designed around central concerns of 
individual freedom and values such as laïcité and neutrality, 1 a growing 
body of historical literature proposes a less dichotomic interpretation of the 
relationship between early modern toleration and constitutional religious 
freedom. The question on the visibility of religion seems to shape the current 
legal, political, and social debates on the role of religion in French society, 
particularly with regard to head coverings such as the much contested 
burkini. In this paper I argue that the numerous “burkini bans” of 2016 
revealed several intolerant tendencies –  in its historical sense – because of 
the nature of the arguments advanced in the local arrêtés and the general 
focus on the visual aspect of the burkini as a sign of (radical) Islam.
This paper opens with a section on religious freedom and toleration, and 
presents a number of historically important factors surrounding toleration 
and the restriction thereof. These factors are presented as an assessment 
framework. The paper will then analyze the legal and political arguments made 
in the local arrêtés, comparing them with the factors of toleration. For if it is 
true that early modern toleration has shaped modern and constitutionalized 
religious freedom, one would expect to observe some resonances with 
the factors of toleration in contemporary legal-political cases on religious 
freedom. Whereas not all aspects of the factors of toleration are necessarily 
incompatible with the functioning of state bodies, these might enter into 
conflict with the imperative of neutrality and impartiality. Therefore, this 
paper concludes with some critical reflections regarding neutrality and laicité 
in conversation with the framework of toleration, particularly with regard 
to the visibility of difference and the value of protecting individual freedom.
1. H. VAN OOIJEN, Religious Symbols in Public Functions, Cambridge, Intersentia 2012, p. 163-
175.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TOLERATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Toleration and religious freedom are not each other’s conceptual 
equivalents. Toleration in early modern contexts (ca. 1500-1789) entailed a 
governmental technique in regulating diversity after the disintegration and 
fragmentation of the medieval Corpus Christianum, specifically in distinction 
from tolerance which concerned social and political attitudes. 2 This governing 
of diversity was focused on a range of “others” who were not only religiously 
or socially different, but were further judged as mistaken, wrong, or potentially 
dangerous in a community. 3 Toleration was thus associated with a level of 
power combined with a certain normative or moral dominance. Toleration 
entailed a long-suffering restraint of governmental force towards these others, 
whereas other policies could include punishment, exile, or elimination. 4 
Toleration was typically used instrumentally towards a degree of outward 
conformity of action: levels of toleration tended to be expressed in dynamic 
layers of visibility or invisibility within a community, as carefully described 
by historian Benjamin Kaplan. 5
Particular decisions on toleration tended to be guided by a set of factors. 
These factors stem from a comparison of late-scholastic conceptions of 
toleration and literature on governmental practices of early modern toleration. 
The first factor is the perception of truth and falsehood, which informs 
understandings of good and evil. 6 This factor was deeply influenced by 
contemporary normative standards as typically associated with a particular 
Church. The factor of truth is secondarily informed by levels of proximity and 
transience of the alleged evil, the balancing of which determined the measure 
of long suffering required. 7 Other factors include perceptions of the common 
2. I.  P.  BEJCZY, “Tolerantia: a medieval concept”, Journal of the History of Ideas, July  1997, 
p. 365-384; B.  J. KAPLAN, Divided by faith. Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration 
in Early Modern Europe, London, Belknap Press, 2007; E. H. SHAGAN, The Rule of Mode-
ration: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011.
3. I. P. BEJCZY, art. cit., p. 368.
4. J. COSTA LOPEZ, “Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering of Jews and 
Muslims through medieval canon law”, Review of International Studies, July 2016, p. 461.
5. B. J. KAPLAN, op. cit., ch. 5-8; Further, J. R. COLLINS, “Redeeming the Enlightenment: New 
Histories of Religious Toleration”, The Journal of Modern History, 2009, p. 607-636, p. 613.
6. I. P. BEJCZY, art. cit., p. 366.
7. Ibid., p. 371-376.
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good, outward public unity, public order, and economic expediency. 8 Finally, 
the degree of mutual social trust informed perceived levels of threat. These 
factors functioned kaleidoscopically rather than monolithically and could 
lead in different contexts to different outcomes.
Religious freedom in the context of the liberal constitutional state is 
normatively and functionally distinct from early modern toleration. Crucially, 
citizens are principally free as to belief, conscience, and action in matters of 
religion unless rational and pressing reasons warrant restrictive regulation. 
Restrictive regulation is further bound by the constraints of the constitutional 
structure. Equal citizenship further implies that governmental regulation 
of diversity may not employ the rhetoric of otherness associated with 
toleration. In France, religious freedom is connected with its commitment 
to the protection of human rights (Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen 1789) and laïcité, which encompass the doctrine of the separation of 
church and state in support and preservation of individual freedom (The 1905 
Loi concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État).
Religious freedom is further embedded in a “secular” liberal constitutional 
context. Though secularity is understood to be ontologically and morally less 
prescriptive 9 compared to religious truth vis-à-vis toleration, power structures 10 
and a measure of tradition-specific normativity 11 do inform discussions on 
the rights of religious minorities. Both human rights and laïcité develop 
dynamically. For example, an absolute separation of church and state was 
never really enforced under the Third Republic, and several politicians, such 
as Georges Clemenceau, called for equal access to the public space. 12 Current 
 8. Ibid., p. 371-376.
 9. L.  ZUCCA, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, Chap.  10; as opposed to secularism that is moralising. 
Compare with the idea of “universalising tendencies” as in E. SHAKMAN HURD, “The Poli-
tical Authority of Secularism in International Relations”, European Journal of International 
Relations, 10:2, p. 235-262, p. 237.
10. W.  BROWN, Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton 
University Press, 2006, p. 178.
11. G.  D’COSTA, “Whose Objectivity, Which Neutrality? The Doomed Quest for a Neutral 
Vantage Point from Which to Judge Religions”, Religious Studies, 29:1, p. 79-95, p. 95; 
Laïcité and neutrality might be related in the French context, it importantly does not 
amount to constitutional atheism. See H. PENA-RUIZ, Qu’est-ce que c’est la laïcité ?, Paris, 
Gallimard 2003, p. 32-40; J.-M. PIRET, “La laïcité française: de zuiverheid van het consti-
tutionele ideaal”, in P.  DE  HERT & K.  MEERSCHAUT, Scheiding van kerk en staat of actief 
pluralism?, Oxford, Intersentia 2007, p. 131.
12. P.  D’HOLLANDER, “The Church in the Street in Nineteenth-Century France”, Journal of 
the Western Society for French History, 2004, p. 189.
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debates on Muslim integration also feature values of individual freedom and 
laïcité. Yet the meaning of laïcité seems to have evolved to incorporate cultural 
dimensions, much to the concern of scholars such as Philippe Gaudin and 
Jean Baubérot. 13
However, the question of visibility in the open space is no stranger in 
France’s constitutional and democratic state, which was powerfully illustrated 
by waves of local procession bans in the nineteenth century. The Catholic 
Church deliberately employed processions to increase its urban visibility and 
to tangibly underscore its relevance to society in response to rapid social 
and political changes. 14 This open encounter caused immediate and explicit 
tensions on the street. 15 Some counter-demonstrators argued that syndicalist 
and political opinions should gain a standing equal to religion, thus advocating 
in a more inclusive open space. 16 Several waves of restrictions and bans on 
processions led to strong popular and political debate  –  historian Kaiser 
characterizes this situation as one of “gradual radicalization”. 17 Arguments for 
restrictions related to 1) allegations over the public nuisance of a procession, 
2)  a threat to public order because of popular violence, 3)  a disguise as a 
political demonstration, and 4) the idea that public presence somehow was 
an imposition on all. 18
This example indicates a set of important questions that appear to be 
relevant for reflections on the burkini arrêtés: does freedom imply free 
manifestation in the public space? Is public unity and order maintained by a 
superficial unity or by inclusive diversity? On what basis could a government 
legitimately restrict individual freedom and stemming from that, collectively 
freedom? On what basis are arguments on public order justified? At what 
point might restrictive regulation become intolerant? These are all questions 
that relate to the burkini debates as well. Although toleration and religious 
freedom are distinct concepts, the study of local arrêtés concerning the 
burkini offers an interesting test case with regards to the connection between 
13. J. BAUBÉROT, La laïcité falsifiée, Paris, La Découverte, 2012, p. 39-40; P. GAUDIN, “Répu-
blique and laïcité. What is at stake in contemporary France?”, Philosophy and social 
criticism, no. 4-5, 2016, p. 440-447.
14. P. D’HOLLANDER, art. cit., p. 171-172.
15. Ibid., p. 188.
16. Ibid.
17. W. KAISER, “‘Clericalism – that is our enemy!’: European anticlericalism and the culture 
wars”, in C. CLARK and W. KAISER, Culture wars. Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth 
Century Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 75-76.
18. P. D’HOLLANDER, art. cit., p. 180.
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the visibility of difference and the currency of the factors related to toleration 
in the legal argumentation.
3. THE LANGUAGE OF TOLERATION IN THE 2016 BURKINI ARRÊTÉS
From July 28 to late August 2016, more than thirty mayors of French 
(representing mostly coastal communities) banned the burkini as well as the 
jilbab from beaches for reasons varying from public order and appeals to the 
principle of laïcité, to public health and the notion of good morality. These 
arrêtés have reinvigorated debates across France about the compatibility of 
French and Islamic values. This section will survey the reasoning of several 
of the local authorities as well as administrative courts dealing with the 
arrêtés. Herein, the aim is to investigate the resemblance of factors relating 
to toleration: truth, common good, public order and unity, economic 
considerations, and trust in the arrêtés of Cannes, Villeneuve-Loubet and 
Sisco. The arrêtés of Cannes and Villeneuve-Loubet were the earliest and 
though upheld in a regional court, were the eventually suspended. The 
Conseil d’État suspended the Villeneuve-Loubet arrêté on 26  August 2016, 
after which all arrêtés across France were suspended by regional courts, with 
the exception of the arrêté issued in Sisco.
The arrêtés show a remarkable resonance in their reasoning and language, 
even though the mayors of the various towns were associated with different 
political parties. On July 28, 2016, the mayor of Cannes David Lisnard 
prohibited “ostentatious religious attire” on the public beaches, 19 but according 
to the media Nice Matin and Le Monde, he clarified that this referred to the 
burkini and jilbab only, and not to other religious expressions, such as the 
kippah or the cross. 20 Speaking shortly after the Nice-attack of July 2016, he 
argued that the threat of terrorist attacks would warrant the prohibition of 
burkinis on the beaches: the burkini would be a sign of religious extremism. 
19. “Une tenue de plage manifestant de manière ostentatoire une appartenance religieuse” : 
“Burkini : le maire de Cannes interdit les vêtements religieux à la plage”, Le Monde, 11 août 
2016: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/08/11/le-maire-de-cannes-interdit-les-
vetements-religieux-a-la-plage_4981587_3224.html [accessed 4 June 2018].
20. “Le maire de Cannes interdit le port du burkini sur les plages”, Nice matin, 11 août 2016: 
http://www.nicematin.com/faits-de-societe/le-maire-de-cannes-interdit-le-port-du-burkini-
sur-les-plages-70612 [accessed 4  June 2018]. “Burkini : le maire de Cannes interdit les 
vêtements religieux à la plage”, Le Monde, 11 août 2016.
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He further framed the arrêté in the context of respecting good morality, 
laïcité, hygiene and security rules. 21
The mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet Lionel Luca issued a similar arrêté for 
the public beaches in his community which is located close to Cannes. On 
the basis of public order, he prohibited all attire that did not express respect 
“good morality”, “the principle of laïcite”, and “hygiene” and “security rules” 
in the context of the “maritime public domain”. 22 Two mayors on the island of 
Corsica, Ange-Pierre Vivoni of Sisco and Francis Giudici of Ghisonaccia issued 
similar arrêtés solely concerned with swimming attire. 23 Interestingly, the 
immediate cause for the mayor of Sisco to prohibit burkinis was a riot between 
youth from the city and North African families in which more than forty 
people would have been involved. 24 The mayor suspected that the wearing 
of ostentatious religious attire could have been a source of serious conflict. 25
French mayors are competent to issue arrêtés towards public order, 
which explains the explicit appeal to public order in the text. However, 
the reasoning in the Villeneuve-Loubet case was scrutinized by the tribunal 
administratif at Nice upon dispute by the Collectif contre l’islamophobie (CCI) 
and the Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH). The court at first affirmed the 
arrêtés. It argued that, after the Nice attack, these swimming suits could 
be taken by others as a sign that is not just an expression of religion. The 
burkini could form a risk for public order. Furthermore, the court judged 
it to be a proportionate prohibition because of its temporal nature, that is 
during the month of August. 26 Yet the court did not specify the exact nature 
of the risk entailed and what precisely would be expressed by the attire in 
21. “L’accès aux plages et à la baignade est interdit […] à toute personne n’ayant pas une tenue 
correcte, respectueuse des bonnes mœurs et de la laïcité, respectant les règles d’hygiène 
et de sécurité des baignades adaptées au domaine public maritime.”, cited on “Burkini : 
le maire de Cannes interdit les vêtements religieux à la plage”, Le Monde, 11 août 2016.
22. Arrêté du 5 août 2016 du maire de la commune de Villeneuve-Loubet, portant règlement 
de police, de sécurité et d’exploitation des plages concédées par l’État à la commune de 
Villeneuve-Loubet, no. 2016-42 annule et remplace no. 2016-41, § 4.3.
23. Arrêté du 16 août 2016 du maire de la commune de Sisco, portant interdiction d’accès aux 
plages et de baignade à toute personne n’ayant pas une tenue correcte. Arrêté no. 2016-37 
du 18 août 2016 du maire de la commune de Ghisonaccia, portant interdiction de porter 
des tenues non correctes, non respectueuses des bonnes mœurs et de la laïcité sur les 
plages et pour la baignade sur l’ensemble du territoire communal, § 1.
24. Arrêté du 16 août 2016 du maire de la commune de Sisco.
25. “Considérant que les tenues vestimentaires religieuses ostentatoires peuvent être source 
de conflit grave […]”: arrêté du 16 août 2016 du maire de la commune de Sisco.
26. TA Nice, 13 août 2016, no. 1603470, § 6; TA Nice, 22 août 2016, no. 1603508, 1603523, 
§ 8.
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question. An appeal followed to the Conseil d’État, which ruled against the 
Villeneuve-Loubet arrêté.
The Conseil d’État explained that the argumentation for the arrêté remained 
insufficient. It judged that there were no tangible risks of terrorism and it 
found the mere sentiment of fear to be insufficient for warranting an arrêté 
that limited the fundamental freedoms of citizens this severely. 27 It also 
stipulated that other concerns, such as good morality and hygiene could not 
sustain an arrêté without an apparent risk to the public order. 28 Following 
this ruling, the tribunal administratif of Nice suspended the Villeneuve-Loubet 
arrêté on August 26, 2016, as well as the Cannes arrêté on August 30, 2016. 
Although the arrêtés were suspended across France, a high number of mayors 
have been attempting to reinforce their arrêtés nevertheless. The tribunal 
administratif of Bastia upheld the arrêté of Sisco on the ground of public 
order because of the actual unrest that had occurred on its beaches. 29
Upon the decision of the Conseil d’État, the Prime Minister Manual Valls 
posted a long note on the burkini debate on his Facebook-page. While 
recognizing that a mayor’s power is limited by constitutional law, he went 
on to argue that the burkini controversy is a multifaceted fight, encompassing 
cultural and political dimensions. 30 He wrote that the burkini is a political 
sign as much as a religious expression, especially when one considers the 
limitations it would impose on women’s freedom: “Il n’y a pas de liberté qui 
enferme les femmes!”. While he asserted that Muslims are fully part of the 
French society, he also called for modernization of Islam. According to the 
Guardian, he previously insisted that the freedom of Muslims should not 
be restricted, but that political Islam is incompatible with the values of the 
Republic, especially the principle of laïcité. 31 Similarly, President Hollande, 
27. “En l’absence de tels risques, l’émotion et les inquiétudes résultant des attentats terro-
ristes, et notamment de celui commis à Nice le 14  juillet dernier, ne sauraient suffire 
à justifier légalement la mesure d’interdiction contestée.” and “L’arrêté litigieux a ainsi 
porté une atteinte grave et manifestement illégale aux libertés fondamentales que sont 
la liberté d’aller et venir, la liberté de conscience et la liberté personnelle.”: CE, ord., 
26 août 2016, no. 402742, 402777, § 6.
28. “Dans ces conditions, le maire ne pouvait, sans excéder ses pouvoirs de police, édicter 
des dispositions qui interdisent l’accès à la plage et la baignade alors qu’elles ne reposent 
ni sur des risques avérés de troubles à l’ordre public ni, par ailleurs, sur des motifs 
d’hygiène ou de décence.”: CE, ord., 26 août 2016, no. 402742, 402777, § 6.
29. TA Bastia, 26 janv. 2017, no. 600976, 1600980, § 5.
30. Post Manual Valls, 26 Aug. 2016: https://www.facebook.com/notes/manuel-valls/assumons-
le-d%C3%A9bat-sur-le-burkini/1125932284153781/ [accessed 4 June 2018].
31. According to The Guardian, A. CHRISAFIS, “French PM supports local bans on burkinis”, 
18 Aug. 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/17/french-pm-supports-local-
bans-burkinis [accessed 4 June 2018].
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like many French political figures, expressed that the burkini would be 
incompatible with French values, but he warned against both provocation 
and stigmatization. 32
The political tensions underlying the legal questions concerning the 
burkini indicate the relevance of the notions of truth, the common good, 
outward unity, public order, and trust. Firstly, although the language of truth 
and falsehood might not feature explicitly in the burkini debate, it is clear that 
significant value judgments are made pertaining to expressions over moral 
wrong and danger. The dismissal of (orthodox) Islamic values as inherently 
un-French and arguments about incompatibility with French values, together 
with expressions about the oppression of women have an effect similar to the 
notion of truth in the early modern period: these generalize a specific type 
of Islamic believers as the “other”, and further explicitly associates it with 
something evil. This perhaps follows from a ready conflation of orthodox 
Islam with political Islam and terrorism. In this way, the burkini is framed 
as an apparent wrong against which society would need to defend itself.
Secondly, orthodox Islam is discounted from the goods that inform 
perceptions of the common good. In this regard, the notion of laïcité as one 
of France’s unifying and common goods plays an ambivalent role. While it 
is, at least historically, intended to protect individual freedom, it is somewhat 
prone to generalizations regarding religion in the open space that actually 
limit the freedom it seeks to protect. In this case, laïcité is invoked to justify 
the ban of religious attire of a specific kind. From the reasoning of the arrêtés, 
it appears that these were aimed at burkinis even as these texts contained 
vague and generalized descriptions that could potentially include other types 
of clothing, but which were explicitly indicated as exempt. Considering 
the burkini does not cover more than an ordinary hijab, it shows that 
the seeming neutral language thus ineffectively covers prejudice towards 
Muslims. These restrictions constituted (in the least) indirect discrimination 
against a group of Muslim women. Accordingly, even less traditional media 
mocked the inconsistency of this language featuring a picture of the Chinese 
“facekini” – used to prevent suntan. 33
32. According to France24, K. CHHOR, “Both sides of burkini debate cite French commitment 
to secularism”, 3 sept. 2016: http://www.france24.com/en/20160831-france-commitment-
secularism-burkini-ban-debate-laicite [accessed 4 June 2018].
33. According to the Daily Mail, S. DEAN, “Twitter users mock French burkini ban by asking 
what officials would do if Chinese beachgoers showed up in facekinis”, 30 Aug. 2016: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3764980/Twitter-users-mock-French-burkini-
ban-asking-officials-Chinese-beachgoers-showed-facekinis.html [accessed 4 June 2018].
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Thirdly, the factor of unity is relevant to the burkini controversy insofar 
the recurring problem of visibility of otherness or even deviance in the 
open space is concerned. The inconsistent language of religious and political 
aspects to the burkini is quite curious. This language was also used in the 
bans on Catholic procession in the nineteenth century. In the latter case, 
however, it was well understood that individuals retained their religious 
freedom, whereas individual freedom is crucially at stake in the burkini cases. 
The conflation of arguments indicates that the issue of ownership regarding 
open space is really at stake and the language of neutrality typically aims at 
the exertion of a degree of visible unity. Furthermore, this visible unity might 
only be superficial since a burkini prohibition would not actually eradicate 
ideas one perceives as dangerous: the same people still reside together in 
the same territory. Rather, burkini restrictions are an expression of political 
symbolism, which reinforce an imagined consensus or a level of outward 
unity but really veil some of the precarious social tensions from the realm 
of dialogue.
Fourthly, the factor of public peace and order is the only explicit factor 
of toleration that is formally shared with the legal logic of religious rights 
protection. However, the threshold is higher, as only rationally grounded 
arguments satisfy the requirements of the law. The previous section has 
shown that most arrêtés, and even the Nice court, failed to qualify this factor 
beyond the language of fear and security and therefore were scrutinized by 
the Conseil d’État. It remains unclear what specific threats occurred from 
the burkini itself and for this reason, a restriction of the burkini appears 
symbolic – an ineffective measure towards an intangible threat. Further, and 
fifthly, the question of fear and security is connected with the factor of trust. 
Both the local arrêtés and the expressions of national politicians exerted a 
public anxiety about Islamic fundamentalism, perhaps even Islam in general 
as part of the French society. Such anxiety may be understandable given 
the series of attacks that have been carried out in France in the name of 
Daesh and others, and yet, the automatic association of orthodox Islam with 
terrorism might unhelpfully reinforce the existing divisions of trust where 
dialogue and rapprochement are needed. The Conseil d’État also dismissed 
this shallow justification towards the burkini bans.
The Conseil d’État already considered the adjudicated burkini arrêté “une 
atteinte grave et manifestement illégale aux libertés fondamentales” from a 
legal perspective. 34 Now, it appears that this type of restriction had not only 
34. CE, ord., 26 août 2016, no. 402742, 402777, § 6.
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been unlawful, but further substantially relied on the factors associated with 
early modern toleration: the factors of public peace and order, truth, the 
common good, unity and trust.
4. CONCLUSION: INTOLERANCE UNVEILED?
The unlawfulness of the local burkini arrêtés shows a further and 
significant liability to the factors of toleration: the factors of truth, common 
good, outward unity, public order, and trust. Offhand dismissal of Islam by 
both local and national politicians as “other” and “incompatible” with French 
values, combined with a casual association with terrorism and a rhetoric 
of not belonging, is profoundly problematic. Interestingly, and reinforcing 
the argument of toleration, the crux of the burkini bans has again been the 
visibility of perceived deviance in the open space. This focus fails to address 
the underlying social disunity and (worryingly) invigorates the intense 
existing divisions. Rather, this focus on visibility inherently reinforces the 
reality of diversity or disintegration that it seeks to level. It highlights the 
problematic conflation of outward unity and (an imagined) consensus, which 
was so strongly prevalent in the Corpus Christianum and its aftermath in the 
early modern period.
Not all aspects of toleration are incompatible with the logic of religious 
freedom and the French constitutional framework in general. Particularly 
the factor of public order, as long as argued coherently and rationally, serves 
structurally in constitutional logic. However, the scope for legitimate uses 
of the factors of toleration is limited. Moreover, and as the burkini bans 
have shown, poorly justified uses are liable to restrictive and intolerant 
tendencies in its historical sense. Given the commonly assumed distinction 
between toleration and constitutional religious freedom, these cases provide 
material for reflection on toleration, the matter of visibility, neutrality, and 
its relationship with individual religious freedom. Beyond legal and political 
meta-narratives of toleration versus religious freedom, one should be wary of 
new variations of the burkini bans and all other particular instances of the 
regulation of political and religious minorities that may exert governmental 
intolerance, despite seemingly neutral language. Such actions may entail a 
détournement de pouvoir and as potential instances of regression in toleration 
need to be fiercely scrutinized with a keen eye to the protection of individual 
freedom, the rights of minorities, and France’s democratic principles.
